.jpg){kind=link}
Court rules open justice justified naming the acquitted director in the DPA approval judgment
The High Court has dismissed a judicial review challenge brought by Robb Simms-Davies against Southwark Crown Court over the publication of a de-anonymised judgment approving two deferred prosecution agreements.
In Robb Simms-Davies v Southwark Crown Court, the Divisional Court, comprising Lord Justice Lewis and Mr Justice Bennathan, ruled on 18 February 2026 that the principle of open justice applied to the publication of the judgment and that there was no basis to maintain anonymity following the claimant’s acquittal.
The case concerned two deferred prosecution agreements entered into between the Serious Fraud Office and Bluu Solutions Limited and Tetris-Projects Limited under Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. In July 2021, a Crown Court judge approved the agreements and handed down an anonymised judgment referring to two company directors as “Director 1” and “Director 2”.
At the time, criminal proceedings against individuals, including Mr Simms-Davies, were ongoing. The judge both anonymised the individuals and imposed reporting restrictions. Those individuals were later tried and acquitted. In March 2023, reporting restrictions were lifted. The judge subsequently issued a version of her original approval judgment naming the companies and the two directors.
Mr Simms-Davies, who had been identified as “Director 1” in the earlier version, challenged the decision to publish the judgment in un-anonymised form. He argued that he had not been a party to the DPA negotiations or the approval proceedings and that the judge had wrongly treated the issue as one governed by the principle of open justice. He contended that anonymity should remain unless disclosure was necessary.
The Divisional Court rejected that argument. It held that the approval of a deferred prosecution agreement forms part of the administration of justice and that the principle of open justice applies. The starting point, the court said, is publication, including naming individuals, unless it is shown to be necessary to derogate from that principle in order to protect rights such as those under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The court concluded that the judge had applied the correct legal approach. It noted that the approval judgment expressly stated that no findings of fact were made against individuals and that the DPA process concerned corporate liability only.
Finding no error of law in the judge’s reasoning, the Divisional Court dismissed the claim for judicial review.