The High Court has allowed a bank’s appeal in a dispute over the recovery of eight classic and high-value cars financed through five hire-purchase agreements. The judgment examines the limits of remedies for an allegedly unfair credit relationship and the importance of properly pleading a claim based on fiduciary duty and rescission.
What did the High Court decide?
In Cambridge & Counties Bank Limited v Mark Thompson [2026] EWHC 2949 (BP), handed down on 16 November 2026, HHJ Paul Matthews, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, allowed the bank’s appeal against the order of District Judge Napier dated 19 January 2026.
The district judge had refused to make an order for the return of the vehicles after finding that Mr Thompson had a realistic prospect of success on an allegation concerning undisclosed broker commission and an unfair relationship under section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
HHJ Matthews held that the district judge should have considered whether the alleged commission could realistically lead to a remedy affecting the bank’s title to the vehicles. He also found that the district judge had relied on a fiduciary-duty and rescission case that had not been pleaded at the time.
What were the finance agreements?
The dispute arose from five hire-purchase agreements entered into between June 2019 and August 2021. They covered eight vehicles, including classic Jaguar models, an Aston Martin, a Bentley, a McLaren, an AC428 Frua and a Jaguar Lister XJS Le Mans.
The agreements financed a total of £2,678,383. Under their terms, the bank retained title to the vehicles until the respondent exercised the option to purchase them. The bank alleged that Mr Thompson had failed to make payments due under the agreements and that it was entitled to terminate them, recover the vehicles and claim the outstanding sums.
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Agreements | Five hire-purchase agreements entered into between June 2019 and August 2021 |
| Vehicles | Eight vehicles in total |
| Total finance | £2,678,383 |
| Alleged broker commission | £38,658.35, or thereabouts |
| Termination notice | 3 October 2025 |
| Appeal judgment | 16 November 2026 |
Why was the return of goods order refused?
The bank wrote to Mr Thompson on 11 September 2025 alleging arrears under the agreements. On 3 October 2025, its solicitors gave notice terminating the agreements and demanded repayment of the outstanding balances and delivery up of the vehicles. One of the cars, the Jaguar Lister, had by then been sold.
The bank issued its claim on 19 November 2025. Mr Thompson denied liability and counterclaimed for declarations, repayment, damages and other relief. Among his allegations were that the bank had not acquired title to the vehicles, that some recorded sale prices or deposits had not genuinely been paid, that the transactions were in substance secured refinancing, and that undisclosed commissions had been paid to his broker, Balanced Funding Solutions Ltd.
At the hearing on 8 January 2026, District Judge Napier considered the matter as if it were an application for summary judgment. He rejected the arguments challenging the bank’s title as having no real prospect of success, but considered that the allegation of undisclosed commission and an unfair relationship under section 140A had a realistic prospect of success. He therefore refused an immediate return-of-goods order and gave directions for the parties to amend their pleadings.
The bank appealed, arguing that the judge had failed to examine whether the alleged commission could lead to a remedy that affected the bank’s ownership or right to possession. It also argued that the judge had relied on a fiduciary-duty and rescission case that had not been pleaded.
What did the appeal court say about secret commission?
HHJ Matthews accepted that section 140B gives the court a broad discretion to grant relief where a credit relationship is found to be unfair. That discretion is not, however, without principle. The remedy should reflect and be proportionate to the nature and degree of the unfairness, and should address its causes and reverse damaging financial consequences to the debtor.
The alleged unfairness was the payment of secret commissions of approximately £38,658.35 to the respondent’s broker in connection with finance totalling £2,678,383. The judge considered that an order depriving the bank of title to the vehicles would be disproportionate to that alleged unfairness. It would go beyond removing the cause of the unfairness or reversing its financial consequences.
The court referred to the approach in Patel and to the Supreme Court’s explanation of the remedial discretion in Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2024] AC 955. It also considered the Supreme Court’s treatment of commission remedies in Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2026] AC 877. The possibility of requiring the lender to account for or repay commission did not, on the case advanced, provide a realistic route to a remedy that would remove the bank’s title to the vehicles.
“The order made should reflect and be proportionate to the nature and degree of the unfairness which the court has found.”
— The proportionality approach discussed by HHJ Matthews
Accordingly, the first ground of appeal succeeded. The judge below should not have treated the pleaded commission allegation as, by itself, a reason to refuse summary judgment on the return-of-goods issue without considering the nature of any remedy that could realistically follow.
Why did the fiduciary-duty argument fail?
The second ground concerned the district judge’s suggestion that Mr Thompson might be able to rescind the agreements if he established that the broker owed him fiduciary duties and had breached them by receiving unauthorised profits.
HHJ Matthews held that the defence and counterclaim before the district judge did not allege that the broker owed a fiduciary duty or that the agreements had been rescinded following a breach of such a duty. A party must plead the material facts relied upon. Although a party need not necessarily plead legal propositions, the facts supporting the alleged duty and the material act of rescission must be set out where they form the basis of the claim.
The court acknowledged that a summary judgment judge may consider evidence that can reasonably be expected to become available at trial. That does not mean the court can assume that the claim itself may later be transformed into a different cause of action. The district judge had therefore been wrong to rely on a fiduciary-duty and rescission case that had not then been advanced.
Nor did the later amended pleading change the result. Its paragraph 122 was framed conditionally, referring to relief if the respondent proved that the broker owed and breached fiduciary duties. The proposed claim was directed at the broker, who had not been joined as a party. It did not allege that the bank owed a fiduciary duty or had committed bribery, and it did not provide particulars of the alleged unauthorised profits. HHJ Matthews considered that this was not a sufficient legal basis to take the proposed claim into account when deciding the summary judgment application.
What is the effect of the judgment?
The appeal was allowed on both grounds. The High Court directed that the district judge’s order be varied to provide for the immediate return of the goods, with the exception of the Jaguar Lister motorcar that had already been sold.
The judgment does not determine every issue in the underlying proceedings. In particular, the court’s conclusion concerned whether the pleaded unfair-relationship and fiduciary-duty arguments justified refusing the bank’s application for the return of the vehicles at the summary judgment stage. HHJ Matthews invited counsel to consider the consequential changes required to the order and indicated that a short remote hearing could be arranged if the parties could not agree a minute of order.
For lenders and borrowers involved in asset-finance disputes, the decision illustrates the importance of identifying the remedy that could realistically follow from an unfair-relationship allegation. It also underlines that a party seeking to rely on fiduciary duties and rescission must properly plead the material factual basis for that case.
Frequently asked questions
What was the dispute in Cambridge & Counties Bank Limited v Thompson?
The bank sought the return of eight vehicles financed under five hire-purchase agreements after alleging payment defaults and terminating the agreements. Mr Thompson disputed the bank’s claims and relied, among other matters, on alleged undisclosed broker commissions and an unfair relationship.
Why did the bank win its appeal?
The High Court held that the alleged secret commission did not create a realistic prospect of a section 140B remedy that would deprive the bank of title to the vehicles. It also held that the district judge had relied on a fiduciary-duty and rescission claim that had not been pleaded at the time.
How much commission was allegedly paid to the broker?
The judgment refers to alleged commissions of £38,658.35, or thereabouts, paid to the respondent’s broker.
Did the High Court order the return of all eight vehicles?
The order was for the immediate return of the goods except for the Jaguar Lister motorcar that had already been sold.
Did the court decide that the broker had breached fiduciary duties?
No. The court held that the fiduciary-duty and rescission case was not properly pleaded in the form before the district judge, and that the later conditional pleading did not provide a sufficient basis for taking it into account on the summary judgment issue.