A purchaser that tried to recover a 10% deposit after the seller failed to complete a land sale on the contractual date has lost its appeal before the Privy Council. The Board ruled that the purchaser had purported to terminate without first serving a notice to complete, even though time was not of the essence under the contract.
What did the Privy Council decide?
In Teresa De Silva v Dindial’s Hardware Limited (Trinidad and Tobago) [2026] UKPC 39, handed down on 13 November 2026, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council dismissed the appeal brought by Dindial’s Hardware Limited (“Dindial”). Lord Briggs delivered the judgment of a Board comprising Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs, Lord Hamblen, Lord Doherty and Lord Snowden.
The appeal concerned the interaction between two principles governing contracts for the sale of land: the requirement to serve a notice making time of the essence before terminating for late completion, and the limited exception allowing a purchaser to walk away where the vendor has no title and no enforceable right to obtain it.
The Board concluded that the exception did not apply. Teresa de Silva (“Mrs de Silva”) had a contractual right to require the property to be conveyed to her or to a person she nominated. The outstanding probate affected the timing of that right being exercised, rather than whether the right existed.
What was the dispute about?
The dispute arose from two linked contracts concerning a freehold property in Maraval, Trinidad and Tobago. In October 2016, Mrs de Silva agreed to purchase the property from Abdul Latif Kazim for US$1.5 million. The property formed part of the estate of the late Ebrahim Kazim, and completion depended on the necessary grant of probate or administration being obtained.
The October contract expressly stated that time for completion was not to be of the essence, anticipating that probate might take time. It also provided for the property to be transferred to Mrs de Silva or to whoever she directed.
On 10 November 2016, Mrs de Silva agreed to sell the property on to Dindial for TT$13 million. Dindial paid a 10% deposit of TT$1.3 million. Completion was set for 28 February 2017. The contract required Mrs de Silva to provide an up-to-date land and building tax receipt and a WASA clearance certificate. It also provided for the return of the deposit if the vendor was unable to complete because of a defect in title, and for forfeiture if the purchaser was unwilling or unable to complete.
By the completion date, probate had not been obtained and the required clearance documents had not been provided. Neither Mrs de Silva nor Mr Kazim was then in a position to complete. Dindial sought repayment of its deposit, but did so without first serving a notice making time of the essence.
- Mrs de Silva enters into the first contract to purchase the Maraval property, with completion dependent on probate.
- Mrs de Silva contracts to sell the property to Dindial for TT$13 million; Dindial pays a 10% deposit.
- Contractual completion date passes without probate or the required clearance documents.
- Dindial emails seeking repayment of its TT$1.3 million deposit, without serving a notice to complete.
- Letters of administration with the will annexed are obtained for Mr Kazim’s use and benefit.
- The property is assented to Mr Kazim.
- The Privy Council hears the appeal.
- The Board dismisses Dindial’s appeal.
Why was a notice to complete required?
The Board reaffirmed the completion notice principle. Where a contract for the sale of land does not make time of the essence, a party cannot ordinarily treat failure to complete on the contractual date as a ground for termination unless it first serves a notice specifying a further reasonable completion date and making time of the essence. The other party must then fail to complete by that further date.
The November contract did not expressly make time of the essence. The Board also considered the earlier October contract, which had been disclosed to Dindial by the time the November contract was made. That earlier contract expressly anticipated delay in obtaining probate and stated that time was not of the essence. It formed part of the context in which the parties made the later contract.
Against that background, the Board considered it commercially irrational to interpret the November contract as making time essential when both parties knew that Mrs de Silva’s ability to obtain title depended on the probate process, and that the earlier contract allowed time for that process.
“That was a ‘when’ rather than ‘whether’ question.”
The Board’s description of the timing of Mr Kazim’s ability to convey the property under the disclosed contractual arrangement.
Dindial’s email of 4 March 2017 asserted a right to bring the contract to an end and recover the deposit. Since no notice to complete had been served, the Board agreed with the Court of Appeal that this purported termination amounted to a repudiatory breach by Dindial. Mrs de Silva was entitled to accept that repudiation and treat the deposit as forfeited under the contract.
How did the “no title” principle apply?
The Board also considered the no title principle. In limited circumstances, a purchaser may treat a contract as at an end upon discovering that the vendor has no title to convey and no legally enforceable right to obtain title from another person. The principle is concerned with a fundamental absence of title, not a minor or removable defect.
The Board discussed Forrer v Nash (1865) 35 Beav 167 and the relevant observations in Pips (Leisure Productions) Ltd v Walton (1980) 43 P & CR 415. It also referred to Wylson v Dunn (1887) 34 Ch D 569. Those authorities distinguish a vendor who has only a hope or expectation of acquiring property from one who already has an enforceable right to require a third party to convey it.
Mrs de Silva fell into the latter category. Under her October contract, she had a contractual right to require Mr Kazim to convey the property either to her or to a nominee, which could include Dindial. The grant of probate affected when that right could be exercised, but did not determine whether the right existed. The risk of delay had also been disclosed to Dindial before it entered into the November contract.
The Board therefore held that the no title principle did not displace the requirement for a notice to complete. The case did not involve a vendor with nothing more than an unenforceable promise or a mere hope of acquiring title.
Why were the late arguments rejected?
Dindial advanced several additional arguments before the Privy Council which had not been properly raised at trial. These included an argument that Mrs de Silva’s principal difficulty was financial, because the onward sale proceeds were in Trinidad and Tobago dollars while the earlier purchase price was payable in US dollars. The Board declined to consider the point because it had not been pleaded and Mrs de Silva had not been given a fair opportunity to address it with evidence.
Dindial also sought to rely on the precise form of the grant obtained in June 2017, arguing that it was letters of administration with the will annexed rather than a grant of probate in favour of Mr Kazim. The Board considered it too late to raise that issue for the first time on appeal, particularly as it could require evidence about Trinidadian probate practice.
Finally, Dindial sought equitable relief from forfeiture of the deposit. The Board held that this claim should have been pleaded and investigated before the trial judge. It was too late to introduce it for the first time before the Privy Council. The Board did not decide the substantive merits of that relief.
What does the judgment mean for property transactions?
The decision highlights the importance of checking the contractual position before treating a land sale as terminated. Where time is not of the essence, a missed completion date will not normally provide an immediate right to walk away. A party seeking to terminate should consider whether a notice to complete is required and ensure that it specifies a reasonable further date.
It also demonstrates why disclosure of title arrangements matters. A purchaser who knows that the vendor’s ability to complete depends on an identified step, such as obtaining probate, may not later be able to rely on that disclosed contingency as though it were a concealed absence of title. The key distinction is whether the vendor has an enforceable right to obtain title, rather than merely an expectation that title may become available.
Although the appeal arose under the law of Trinidad and Tobago, the parties accepted that the relevant principles were materially the same as those under the law of England and Wales. The judgment is therefore of interest to practitioners advising on conveyancing, title investigations, contractual completion provisions and the forfeiture of deposits.
Frequently asked questions
What was the outcome of Teresa De Silva v Dindial’s Hardware Limited?
The Privy Council dismissed Dindial’s appeal. The Court of Appeal’s decision remained in place, meaning Mrs de Silva was entitled to treat Dindial’s attempted termination as repudiatory and retain the deposit.
Why could Dindial not terminate the contract on 28 February 2017?
Time was not of the essence under the November contract. Dindial had not served a notice to complete specifying a further reasonable date and making time essential before purporting to terminate.
What is the no title principle?
It allows a purchaser in limited circumstances to treat a contract as discharged where the vendor has neither title to convey nor an enforceable right to obtain title from another person. It does not apply merely because completion is delayed where the vendor has an enforceable right and the relevant delay was disclosed.
How much was the deposit?
Dindial paid a 10% deposit of TT$1.3 million under the November 2016 contract.
Did the Privy Council decide whether equitable relief from forfeiture was available?
No. The Board held that the claim for relief from forfeiture had been raised too late. It did not determine the substantive merits of that claim.
When was the judgment handed down?
The judgment was handed down on 13 November 2026, following a hearing on 19 October 2026.