Mother Wins Appeal for Leave to Oppose Adoption After Significant Changes in Circumstances

What did the Court of Appeal decide?

In G (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 1445, handed down on 11 November 2026, the Court of Appeal allowed the mother’s appeal against the refusal of her application for leave to oppose an adoption order.

Lord Justice Peter Jackson gave the leading judgment, with Lord Justice Newey and Lady Justice May agreeing. The court concluded that this was a clear case for granting leave. It held that the mother had put forward a solid case requiring consideration, and that the judge below had effectively asked whether her opposition to adoption would succeed rather than whether it was sufficiently substantial to justify an opposed hearing.

The court granted the mother leave to oppose the making of the adoption order and remitted the proceedings for an early case management hearing before a judge nominated by the Family Presiding Judge.

What was the background to the adoption proceedings?

The case concerned D, who was four years old at the time of the appeal. Care proceedings began in April 2024, when D was around 21 months old, and she was placed in foster care. The concerns included the mother’s use of drugs and alcohol, her mental health history and the impact of abusive relationships.

Following a final hearing in March 2025, the Family Court made a care order and a placement order. The judge concluded that the concerns underpinning the threshold for intervention had not been sufficiently addressed within D’s timescales and that adoption was the only realistic option capable of meeting her long-term welfare needs.

D was placed with a prospective adopter in October 2025, and an adoption application was issued in January 2026. The mother later applied for leave to oppose the adoption order, relying on changes in her circumstances since the placement order.

By the time of the application, the mother had also had a son, R, with her new partner. R was subject to a Child Protection Plan, but no care proceedings had been brought in respect of him.

What changes did the mother rely on?

In a statement dated 24 July 2026, the mother identified a number of developments which she said demonstrated a material change in her circumstances:

• Abstinence from drugs and alcohol since August 2025, supported by regular testing and engagement with rehabilitation and recovery services.
• Maintaining abstinence despite the deaths of both her parents in January 2026.
• Completion of psychotherapy.
• Obtaining stable accommodation.
• Ending an abusive relationship and obtaining a restraining order against her former partner.
• Beginning a new relationship in August 2025, which she described as stable and supportive.
• Living with her new partner from March 2026 and caring for R without care proceedings.

The local authority accepted that there had been a change in the mother’s circumstances. It described her abstinence as a significant achievement and a substantial change, and accepted that her current relationship was stable and different in character from her previous relationships.

However, the local authority considered that the changes were relatively recent and had not been tested over time. It argued that D was settled with the prospective adopter and needed the certainty and permanence of an adoption order.

How did the Family Court approach the test?

The judge accepted that the first stage of the statutory test was satisfied. The mother’s sustained abstinence, engagement with services, therapeutic work, new relationship, stable accommodation and care of R amounted to a relevant change in circumstances.

At the second stage, however, the judge refused leave. He considered that the mother’s recovery and relationship remained relatively recent and insufficiently tested, that her domestic abuse work was incomplete, and that there was limited evidence about her partner’s role and how the needs of both children would be met.

The judge placed significant weight on D’s settled placement, her attachments within the prospective adopter’s family and the risk that further proceedings would introduce uncertainty. He concluded that the mother’s prospects of successfully resisting the adoption application were not sufficiently strong to justify leave.

The mother appealed on three grounds, arguing that the judge had failed properly to weigh her changed circumstances, had placed improper weight on gaps in the evidence at the permission stage, and had wrongly concluded that leave was inconsistent with D’s welfare.

Why did the appeal succeed?

The Court of Appeal revisited the two-stage approach under section 47(5) and section 47(7) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Where a child has been placed with prospective adopters under a placement order, a parent may not oppose the adoption order without the court’s leave. The court cannot grant leave unless it is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances since the placement order was made.

Drawing on Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, Re M (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2023] EWCA Civ 404 and Re W (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2020] EWCA Civ 16, the court stressed that the second-stage assessment is a broad and practical welfare evaluation.

“The court is asking whether a case is a ‘runner’, not whether it is a ‘winner’.”

The Court of Appeal identified several errors in the approach below. First, the judge’s assessment had become too detailed for a threshold decision and risked turning the leave application into a trial of the adoption application on incomplete evidence.

Second, the question was whether it was in D’s interests for there to be an opposed adoption hearing, not whether it was in her interests to be adopted. The decision at this stage concerns the management of the adoption application, rather than its ultimate outcome.

Third, the mother did not have to establish that she was more likely than not to succeed in opposing adoption. She needed to demonstrate a solid, substantial case that deserved consideration. The Court of Appeal considered that the judge’s conclusion that her prospects were not sufficiently strong had applied a test that was too stringent and close to being unachievable.

The court also considered that too much weight had been placed on the short-term disruption that a contested hearing might cause to D’s present placement. The judgment emphasised the need to consider D’s lifelong welfare, including the potential benefit of having the adoption question properly examined in light of the mother’s changed circumstances and D’s relationship with her birth family and sibling.

Finally, the Court of Appeal noted that some of the evidential gaps identified by the judge – including matters concerning the mother’s partner and a rehabilitation plan – could be clarified through further evidence and professional assessment. Those gaps should not, in the circumstances, have counted against the mother’s application at the leave stage.

What happens next?

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, granted the mother leave to oppose the adoption order and remitted the proceedings for an early case management hearing.

The court expressly stated that it was making no finding about the eventual outcome of the adoption application. That question will now be determined by the Family Court on the basis of all the evidence.

The judgment therefore does not reverse the placement order or decide that D should return to her mother’s care. It gives the mother permission to contest the adoption application, with the child’s welfare remaining the paramount consideration in the proceedings that follow.