Court says procedural problems caused delay but did not make the judgment unsafe.
The Court of Appeal has refused Suleman Patel’s appeal against a High Court decision concerning his fitness to practise as an optometrist, finding no arguable case that procedural irregularities had caused injustice. The judgment was handed down on 22 September 2026 in Suleman Patel v General Optical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 1206.
Mr Patel had originally been found guilty of serious misconduct involving dishonesty by the General Optical Council’s Fitness to Practise Committee on 5 January 2024. His fitness to practise was found to be impaired and he was suspended from practice for nine months, although the suspension was not to take effect pending appeal.
He subsequently appealed to the High Court under section 23G(3) of the Opticians Act 1989. That appeal was heard remotely on 20 November 2024 by Richard Clayton KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. The High Court dismissed the appeal in a judgment handed down on 17 March 2026.
Mr Patel then sought permission for a second appeal, arguing that the general handling of his case raised concerns about whether the appeal had been dealt with to the expected standard and whether the resulting judgment was reliable. The Court of Appeal treated the challenge as one based on procedural irregularity rather than an allegation that the High Court’s substantive decision was wrong.
The case had involved a number of unusual procedural difficulties. During the November 2024 hearing, the Deputy Judge was recovering from surgery for a ruptured Achilles tendon and conducted the hearing remotely from bed. He initially reported difficulties navigating PDF bundles and taking notes, although the Court of Appeal concluded that he subsequently overcame those difficulties and remained fully engaged with the materials and arguments.
Further problems arose over the production and finalisation of the judgment. A draft oral judgment was delivered in December 2024, but the final written judgment was not provided until March 2026. The Court noted that the parties had repeatedly sought clarification and that there was still no order disposing of the High Court appeal or determination of some consequential matters, including costs.
Lord Justice Phillips accepted that the delays deprived the parties of their right to a prompt decision. However, he held that delay does not automatically require a judgment to be set aside. The relevant question was whether the delay made the judge’s conclusions unsafe. In this case, there was no arguable basis for concluding that the final judgment contained errors attributable to the delay.
The Court also acknowledged that the proceedings contained “a number of unusual and unsatisfactory aspects”, but concluded that the Deputy Judge had given full and careful consideration to the appeal. Any injustice arising from the delay could not be cured by allowing the second appeal and ordering the matter to be reconsidered.
The Court therefore refused permission to appeal, finding no real prospect of success, important point of principle or practice, or other compelling reason to grant permission.
In a postscript, Lord Justice Phillips said that, except in exceptional circumstances, judges should only conduct hearings when they have proper access to case documents, adequate working space and the ability to make notes without impediment. He also said that judges should oversee the finalisation and formal handing down of draft judgments, and that reading out draft judgments orally should be discouraged because it can create confusion.