The High Court ruled that no Newton hearing took place, leaving only a guilty plea fee payable
Newton hearing appeal — the High Court has dismissed an appeal by Lloyds PR Solicitors over whether it was entitled to a trial fee under the criminal legal aid remuneration rules.
In R v Farrell [2026] EWHC 2224 (SCCO), Costs Judge Leonard considered whether a sentencing hearing amounted to a “Newton Hearing” for the purposes of the Graduated Fee provisions in Schedule 2 to the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013.
The judgment, dated 25 August 2026, concerned representation provided by Lloyds PR Solicitors to Kieran Farrell before Winchester Crown Court.
Farrell was one of ten defendants in a nine-count indictment concerning the importation into Southampton, unloading and inland distribution of 889 kilograms of cocaine. He pleaded guilty to three of the four charges against him, with the money laundering charge left to lie on file.
For sentencing, the defence argued that Farrell had a limited role in the operation. It said his involvement arose from drug-related debts and that he expected only limited financial advantage. The Crown argued that he had played a significant role and would have been aware of the wider scale of the operation.
Farrell was ultimately sentenced on the basis of a lesser role, adjusted to reflect his overall involvement, including the driving matters and his expectation of significant financial advantage. He received a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment and a six-year extended driving disqualification.
The dispute before the Senior Courts Costs Office was whether the sentencing process amounted to a Newton hearing, which would have entitled the solicitor to a trial fee rather than the fee applicable to a guilty plea.
The 2013 Regulations define a Newton hearing as a hearing at which evidence is heard to determine the sentence of a convicted person in accordance with the principles of R v Newton (1982) 77 Cr App R 13. The judgment explains that three forms of Newton hearing have been identified: disputed facts can be determined by a jury; a judge can hear evidence and reach a conclusion; or a judge can hear submissions without live evidence and reach a conclusion.
Crucially for solicitors, the judgment confirms that live evidence is not essential. However, there must be a fact-finding exercise for the judge to conduct before a hearing can qualify as a Newton hearing under the Regulations.
Costs Judge Leonard noted that a Newton hearing had not been listed in Farrell’s case, although that alone did not mean one could not have taken place. A sentencing hearing can amount to a Newton hearing where the judge undertakes a fact-finding exercise, including on submissions about disputed factual conclusions that materially affect sentence.
That threshold was not met here.
The judge found that the factual evidence was undisputed and that the sentencing judge had drawn an inference from the established facts about Farrell’s awareness of the scale of the operation. The defence had itself accepted that those involved in the cocaine importation would have had some awareness of its scale.
The judgment held that the sentencing judge had not undertaken a fact-finding exercise capable of turning an otherwise ordinary sentencing hearing into a Newton hearing. Instead, he had rejected two unviable interpretations of the undisputed facts.
The court also rejected the argument that Farrell’s intention to use proceeds to repay debts meant he was not expecting a significant financial advantage. Receiving money to pay debts was itself a financial advantage. The relevant point was that Farrell expected to receive a substantial sum for his involvement, rather than how he intended to use it.
Costs Judge Leonard concluded that no Newton hearing had taken place and dismissed the appeal. The decision therefore leaves the solicitor entitled to the guilty plea fee rather than a trial fee in this case.