High Court grants permission for judicial review challenge against Legal Ombudsman decision
The High Court has granted a law firm permission to pursue a judicial review challenge against a decision of the Legal Ombudsman, allowing the claim to proceed to a full substantive hearing.
In Law Lane Solicitors, R (on the application of) v The Legal Ombudsman, the Administrative Court considered a renewed application for permission after the claim had previously been refused on the papers. The case concerns the lawfulness of the Ombudsman’s decision-making process rather than the underlying merits of the client complaint itself.
The dispute arose from a complaint made by a former client, which the Legal Ombudsman upheld. The Ombudsman directed the firm to provide remedies including compensation, fee refunds and the waiver of outstanding fees. The claimant firm subsequently sought to challenge the determination on public law grounds, arguing that the Ombudsman had acted outside its jurisdiction and reached conclusions that were legally flawed.
At the permission stage, the court’s role was limited to determining whether the claim disclosed arguable grounds with a realistic prospect of success or whether there was another compelling reason for the claim to be heard. Judicial review proceedings do not involve the court re-deciding the merits of a complaint but instead focus on whether the decision-making process was lawful, fair and within the decision-maker’s powers.
One of the central issues considered by the court was delay. The claim had not been issued within the usual three-month time limit for judicial review proceedings, and the court therefore had to decide whether an extension of time should be granted. Having reviewed the circumstances, the judge concluded that the balance only just favoured extending time, noting that refusal would prevent potentially arguable jurisdictional issues from being examined at all.
The court also considered procedural failings on the part of the claimant during the litigation, including non-compliance with certain procedural requirements. While these matters weighed against the firm, the judge determined that they did not justify refusing permission altogether and could instead be addressed through costs consequences if appropriate.
Permission was ultimately granted on the basis that at least one of the grounds advanced, relating to the scope of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, was properly arguable and suitable for determination at a full hearing. The court emphasised that granting permission does not mean the challenge will succeed, nor does it imply that the Ombudsman’s decision was wrong. It simply confirms that the issues raised merit full consideration by the court.
The judgment underlines the limited supervisory role played by the courts in relation to ombudsman schemes. The Legal Ombudsman, established under the Legal Services Act 2007, is intended to provide an accessible and informal mechanism for resolving complaints about legal services, applying what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Judicial review remains available, however, where it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted unlawfully or exceeded its powers.
The decision therefore represents a procedural development rather than a final outcome in the dispute. The forthcoming substantive hearing will determine whether the Ombudsman’s decision should be upheld or set aside in accordance with public law principles.
For legal practitioners and students, the case serves as a reminder of the distinction between dissatisfaction with an outcome and an arguable public law challenge to the process by which that outcome was reached. It also illustrates the relatively low threshold applied at the permission stage and the court’s cautious approach in allowing potentially arguable claims to proceed while expressing no view on their ultimate merits.