Court rules care placement restrictions did not amount to deprivation of liberty

The Court of Protection applied a multifactorial Article 5 assessment to AR’s care arrangements

The Court of Protection has ruled that care placement restrictions imposed on a young man living in supported accommodation did not amount to objective confinement and therefore did not engage Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

His Honour Judge Burrows, sitting as a nominated Tier 2 judge of the Court of Protection, made the finding in AR (Whether restrictions amount to a deprivation of liberty), [2026] EWCOP 45 (T2), following a hearing on 26 August 2026. The judgment was handed down on 4 September 2026.

AR, aged 25, has lived in a placement since May 2025. The judgment records that he has moderate to severe learning disability and autistic spectrum disorder and requires constant support across his daily living needs. His current placement was accepted as meeting his needs, and the court was not being asked to order his return to the family home.

The care arrangements include 24-hour one-to-one supervision, two-to-one staffing for community access, locked external doors and gates, window restrictors, staff-controlled access to the community, CCTV, structured routines and occasional physical redirection. The restrictions are intended to address identified risks and support AR’s safety and wellbeing.

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The case was decided against the background of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Northern Ireland reference, [2026] UKSC 16. That decision rejected the previous “acid test” approach associated with Cheshire West and required a broader, multifactorial assessment.

Judge Burrows said the court must consider the individual’s specific circumstances, including the nature and operation of the restrictions, their purpose, the normality of the placement, the person’s attitude towards the arrangements and other relevant factors.

Applying that approach, the judge accepted that the restrictions on AR were substantial. However, they were imposed for care, welfare and protection rather than punishment or discipline. AR lived in a supported living placement rather than a secure establishment, hospital or custodial setting. He was able to take part in community activities, form relationships and personalise his environment.

The judge identified the protective purpose of the restrictions, the relative normality of the placement, the extent of community participation and the absence of institutional or custodial characteristics as decisive. He concluded that AR’s circumstances were not objectively equivalent to confinement for Article 5 purposes.

The court separately considered whether AR could give valid consent. Although he could communicate preferences and emotional responses, the evidence did not establish that he understood the nature of the choice between his placement and living elsewhere, or the restrictions operating within it, sufficiently to give autonomous consent.

Judge Burrows therefore concluded that AR was not deprived of his liberty because the objective element was not established, rather than because he had given valid consent.

The judgment also noted that Article 8 rights remained engaged. Restrictions on residence, care, contact and personal autonomy can remain subject to review under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Court of Protection’s jurisdiction and public authorities’ statutory duties.

The local authority had agreed to fund a Care Act advocate for 12 months to help ensure AR’s rights were observed, particularly regarding contact with his parents and review of the restrictions. The judge decided that no formal court review was necessary at that stage.

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