A procurement challenge brought by Bouygues against the Department for Education has survived a limitation challenge after the High Court examined the calculation of the statutory 30-day period under the Procurement Act 2023.
What did the High Court decide?
In Bouygues (U.K.) Limited v Secretary of State for Education [2026] EWHC 2998 (TCC), the High Court considered preliminary issues concerning the time limit for bringing proceedings under the Procurement Act 2023.
Mr Justice Coppel considered the date on which Bouygues first knew, or ought to have known, of the circumstances giving rise to its claim, the effect of the limitation period ending on a day when the court office was closed, and the date on which proceedings were treated as commenced following electronic filing.
The court concluded that the relevant deadline fell on Monday 5 January 2026 and that the claim was commenced within time. The judgment therefore resolved the preliminary limitation issues in Bouygues’ favour, without determining the substantive merits of the procurement challenge.
What was the procurement dispute?
The proceedings arose from a procurement exercise conducted by the Department for Education. Bouygues challenged aspects of the evaluation process and the scoring of its tender, arguing that the procurement decision involved breaches of the statutory duties governing the award process.
The dispute before the court at this stage was not whether those allegations were ultimately correct. It concerned whether Bouygues had brought its challenge within the time limit imposed by section 106 of the Procurement Act 2023.
The relevant chronology included the Department’s assessment summary, the period in which Bouygues considered the information and obtained advice, and the subsequent submission and issue of the claim form.
- Bouygues receives the assessment summary and the information relevant to its scoring challenge.
- The thirtieth day of the limitation period falls on a Saturday.
- Bouygues submits its claim form through CE-File and pays the issue fee.
- Bouygues notifies the Department of the proceedings.
- The court formally issues the claim form, bearing the date 5 January.
- The High Court determines the preliminary limitation issues in Bouygues’ favour.
When did the limitation period begin?
Section 106(2) of the Procurement Act 2023 requires a supplier to commence proceedings within 30 days beginning with the day on which it first knew, or ought to have known, about the circumstances giving rise to the claim.
Bouygues argued that time should not begin until it had properly considered the assessment summary, obtained input from external advisers and formed an informed view about whether the evaluation could be challenged. It maintained that this process continued into 8 or 9 December 2025.
Mr Justice Coppel rejected that argument. Where a claim is based on the scores and reasons set out in an assessment summary, time will ordinarily begin when the supplier receives that document. The period needed to understand the information, seek advice and decide whether to bring proceedings will generally fall within the 30-day period rather than postpone its start.
The judge explained that the relevant question is whether the facts known to the supplier objectively appear clearly to indicate that an infringement has occurred. The supplier does not need to have reached a collective or final view that the law has been breached, nor does it need to appreciate the legal significance of the facts.
There may be exceptional circumstances in which receipt of an assessment summary does not start time running, such as where the document is unintelligible or ambiguous on a critical point. The judge did not decide whether the same approach would necessarily apply where essential information is provided in another form, such as through extensive disclosure.
On the facts, Bouygues had received the assessment summary, had access to its own tender and the relevant procurement documents, and had the internal expertise to assess the Department’s reasons. The judge found that it had sufficient information on 5 December 2025. Its decision to obtain further external advice did not defer the start of the limitation period.
Why did the deadline move to 5 January?
Although the 30-day period began on 5 December 2025, the thirtieth day fell on Saturday 3 January 2026, when the court office was closed. The issue was whether the limitation deadline should nevertheless expire on that Saturday or move to the next day on which the court office was open.
The judge applied the principle associated with Pritam Kaur v S Russell & Sons Ltd [1973] QB 336. That principle protects a claimant where the final day for taking a procedural step requiring action by the court falls on a day when the court office is closed. The period is treated as extending to the next working day.
The court considered the operation of the principle in the context of electronic filing. The ability to submit documents through CE-File outside ordinary office hours did not displace the principle. Commencing proceedings requires the claim form to be accepted, sealed and issued by the court. A submission made electronically on a non-working day does not, by itself, complete that process.
The judge concluded that the section 106(2) limitation period therefore expired on Monday 5 January 2026, the first working day after Saturday 3 January.
When were the proceedings commenced?
A further dispute concerned the difference between the date on which Bouygues submitted its claim form and the date on which the court formally issued it. Bouygues submitted the form through CE-File at 4.18pm on 5 January 2026. Following correspondence about the issue fee, the court issued the form on 7 January, but it bore an issue date of 5 January.
The judge held that the date relevant to the limitation period was 5 January. Applying the Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Direction 5C, the date entered on the claim form was the date on which the fee for issuing it was paid, which in this case was also the date of electronic submission.
The court distinguished between the act required to commence proceedings and the date attributed to that act under the electronic filing rules. The court office must accept and issue the claim form before proceedings are started, but once the form is accepted, the date stipulated by the rules for limitation purposes may be the earlier date on which it was submitted and the fee paid.
Accordingly, Bouygues had commenced proceedings on the final day of the extended limitation period. The claims were therefore within time.
The judge also addressed the automatic suspension under section 101 of the Act. Bouygues had notified the Department of the proceedings on 6 January, after the extended standstill period had expired on 5 January. The statutory conditions for an automatic suspension were therefore not met, and the Department was free to enter into the framework.
What does the judgment mean for suppliers?
The decision provides important guidance for suppliers considering challenges to public procurement decisions under the Procurement Act 2023. It confirms that the 30-day period is likely to begin when an assessment summary provides the essential facts supporting a scoring challenge. Suppliers should not assume that time will pause while they obtain legal or technical advice or decide whether to litigate.
It also clarifies that a deadline falling on a day when the court office is closed may be extended to the next working day, and explains how the date of commencement is determined where a claim is filed electronically and formally issued later.
The judgment separately considered later allegations concerning moderation records. The judge indicated that allegations of distinct breaches of record-keeping and disclosure duties may be subject to their own limitation periods, running from disclosure of the relevant records. By contrast, later evidence about the moderation of scores will generally be treated as further particulars of an existing scoring challenge, rather than creating a fresh limitation period. The court did not determine the merits of those separate allegations.
For contracting authorities and suppliers alike, the ruling underlines the importance of clear assessment summaries, careful record-keeping and prompt action when procurement concerns arise. The decision concerns preliminary limitation issues only; it does not determine whether the Department’s tender evaluation was unlawful.
Frequently asked questions
What is the limitation period for a procurement challenge under the Procurement Act 2023?
Section 106(2) generally requires a supplier to commence proceedings within 30 days beginning with the day on which it first knew, or ought to have known, about the circumstances giving rise to the claim.
When did the 30-day period begin in Bouygues?
The High Court held that it began on 5 December 2025, when Bouygues received the assessment summary explaining the outcome and reasons for its tender scores.
Does obtaining legal advice delay the start of the limitation period?
Not ordinarily. Where the assessment summary provides the essential facts, time generally runs from receipt of that summary. The time taken to consider it or obtain advice will normally fall within the limitation period.
Why was the deadline extended to 5 January 2026?
The 30-day period would otherwise have expired on Saturday 3 January 2026. Applying the principle in Pritam Kaur v S Russell & Sons Ltd, the court treated the next working day, Monday 5 January, as the deadline.
When was Bouygues treated as having commenced proceedings?
For limitation purposes, the relevant date was 5 January 2026, when the claim form was submitted through CE-File and the issue fee was paid. The court formally issued the form on 7 January, but it bore the earlier date.
Did the judgment decide whether the procurement evaluation was unlawful?
No. The judgment determined preliminary issues about limitation and the timing of particular allegations. It did not decide the substantive merits of Bouygues’ challenge to the evaluation.