A County Court ruling highlights the effect of settling personal injury claims before a claimant’s death
An in-life settlement can prevent dependants from pursuing a later claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 where the original claimant received satisfaction for the same damage, the County Court at Wolverhampton has ruled.
His Honour Judge Grimshaw gave judgment on 18 August 2026 in Angela Ritchie v The Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2026] EWCC 50. The case concerned whether Angela Ritchie could pursue a fatal accident claim after her late husband, Brian Ritchie, had settled a personal injury claim during his lifetime against another alleged tortfeasor.
Brian Ritchie underwent mitral and tricuspid heart valve repair at the defendant’s hospital in March 2015. He was later diagnosed with Mycobacterium Chimaera infection, which the judgment says was believed to have been contracted from a contaminated heater cooler unit used by the defendant and manufactured by a company involved in the earlier settlement.
In 2022, Mr Ritchie pursued a product liability claim against the company. His May 2022 Schedule of Loss claimed £346,963.79 and included general damages, past and future care, treatment, transportation, miscellaneous expenses and a lost years claim. The schedule also pleaded a reduction in life expectancy of about seven years.
The claim was eventually settled on 16 August 2022 for £250,000 in damages plus £20,000 costs. The Settlement Agreement described the settlement as being in full and final settlement and included releases covering claims connected with the infection and the underlying facts. It also expressly referred to claims under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.
Mr Ritchie died on 28 October 2022. Following an inquest, his wife brought proceedings against the Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust. The claim included bereavement damages, funeral expenses and financial dependency, with the total claim put at £35,214.95. The Trust applied to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment.
Judge Grimshaw held that the relevant authorities, including Thompson v Arnold, Jameson v Central Electricity Generating Board and Heaton v AXA Equity & Law Assurance Society Plc, prevented the claim from proceeding in these circumstances.
The judge stressed that settlement with one concurrent tortfeasor does not automatically release another. The key question is whether the claimant received full satisfaction for the relevant harm. Full satisfaction is not necessarily the same as receiving the full potential value of a claim. The court must examine the settlement agreement in its factual context rather than retrospectively calculate what a trial might have awarded.
In this case, Judge Grimshaw found that Mr Ritchie’s settlement covered the losses that could have been recovered during his lifetime. The May 2022 Schedule had already included the reduction in life expectancy and a lost years claim. The judge also found that the alleged failures by the NHS Trust related to suffering arising from the same Mycobacterium Chimaera infection rather than creating a separate additional injury.
The court therefore concluded that Mr Ritchie had received full satisfaction for the relevant loss during his lifetime. He could not have maintained a further claim for the same damage, meaning his dependant could not rely on section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 to bring the later claim.
For solicitors advising seriously ill personal injury claimants, the judgment underlines the need to consider carefully whether a claim should be resolved during the claimant’s lifetime or preserved for potential fatal accident proceedings. Judge Grimshaw noted that a decision must be made because the claimant cannot pursue both routes where the lifetime settlement provides full satisfaction for the same damage.
The judge entered summary judgment in favour of the defendant, rather than striking out the claim. He found there was no reasonable prospect of success because an essential element of the cause of action — recoverable loss — was absent.
The parties were directed to agree the form of order and submit it for approval within seven days of the formal handing down of the judgment.