High Court sets out approach to first substantive referral of a Parole Board release decision
Razzell release decision proceedings have resulted in the High Court quashing a Parole Board direction to release Glyn Razzell on licence, in the first substantive hearing under the new statutory referral power in section 32ZAA of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.
Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb DBE handed down judgment on 14 August 2026 after a two-day hearing on 10 and 11 August. The case concerned a referral by the Secretary of State for Justice of the Parole Board’s decision to release Razzell, who is serving a life sentence for the murder of his wife Linda. The Parole Board had directed his release on 12 April 2026.
The judgment provides important guidance on how the new High Court referral jurisdiction operates. Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb stressed that the High Court is not hearing an appeal from the Parole Board and is not conducting judicial review of its reasoning. Instead, the court must independently decide whether continued confinement remains necessary for public protection.
The statutory test requires the court to be satisfied that there is no more than a minimal risk that the prisoner would commit a further offence causing serious harm if released. If the evidence does not enable the court to reach that positive conclusion, the statutory consequence is that the Parole Board’s release direction must be quashed. The judge emphasised that this is not a balancing exercise and that the sole question is protection of the public.
The court’s assessment focused particularly on the relationship between identified risks and the proposed risk-management plan. The judgment states that courts should consider the assumptions made about a prisoner’s candour, compliance and insight, the external controls available, and whether material risk depends on self-reporting or matters that may be difficult for supervisors to detect.
In Razzell’s case, the judge found that the Parole Board’s decision was careful and detailed but concluded that the court could not itself be satisfied that continued confinement was no longer necessary. The judgment identified concerns including the absence of substantive risk-reduction work, the defendant’s continuing denial, non-disclosure concerning his wife’s remains, and the reliance of proposed risk management on honesty, disclosure and meaningful engagement.
The judge also made clear that non-disclosure under Helen’s Law and continued denial of responsibility were not treated as independent reasons for continued confinement or as automatic bars to parole. Their significance was evidential, particularly in assessing insight, empathy, honesty, self-reflection and the ability to engage with measures intended to manage risk.
The judgment concluded that a future release application would require stronger evidence concerning honesty and cooperation, meaningful engagement with risk reduction, and the development of internal controls rather than substantial reliance on external supervision and unsupported self-reporting.
Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb ultimately held that she was not satisfied that it was no longer necessary for Razzell to remain confined and accordingly quashed the Parole Board’s direction to release him on licence.
For solicitors, the judgment provides a significant early illustration of the new section 32ZAA mechanism. A referral does not invite the High Court merely to test whether a Parole Board decision was reasonable. The court must undertake its own statutory public-protection assessment, with the evidence as a whole informing whether the stringent release threshold has been met.
The judgment also indicates that risk-management proposals require close scrutiny where effective supervision depends on a prisoner’s honesty, disclosure and genuine engagement. The court stated that future evidence must demonstrate progress rather than simply assert it, particularly where previous compliance does not address the central risk identified.
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